In his recent work, "The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy," Hilary Putnam traces the history of the fact-value dichotomy from Hume to Stevenson and Logical Positivism. The aim of this historical reconstruction is to undermine the foundations of the dichotomy, showing that it is of a piece with the dichotomy - untenable, as we know now - of "analytic" and "synthetic" judgments. Putnam's own thesis is that facts and values are "entangled" in a way that precludes any attempt to draw (...) a sharp distinction between "value judgments" and "matters of fact." The idea of an "entanglement of facts and values" Putnam rightly attributes to John Dewey, who - we should add - made of it the main issue in his controversy with Logical Positivism. Nevertheless, a closer inspection of the problem whose history Putnam summarizes could bring into light important aspects of it that have been neglected. It is worth reading in this connection the intercourse between Dewey and Stevenson. Secondly, it is striking that Putnam's version of the history of the fact-value dichotomy hardly mentions the problem that caused this very dichotomy to arise in the first place: i. e., the problem of insoluble moral disagreements. By contrast, Dewey's attack on the dualism of fact and value can be read as an attempt to redescribe this kind of disagreements in a way that makes room for intelligent inquiry, and consequently for rational expectations of agreement. The "entanglement thesis" surely is a part of this re-description. But then it must have implications - particularly for the analysis of value-justification - which are overlooked, or by-passed, by Putnam. This leaves the question open whether Putnam and Dewey subscribe to different versions of pragmatism with regard to norms and values. (shrink)

Este artículo se opone a la tesis recientemente sostenida por John Searle según la cual no existen los derechos humanos positivos. Argumentamos que la existencia de dichos derechos no es contradictoria, como pretende Searle, con las nociones de "derecho" y"derechos humanos" definidas en su ontología social. Por consiguiente, es posible aceptar la ontología social de Searle y afirmar al mismo tiempo que los derechos humanos positivos existen. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos razones para cuestionar la supuesta prioridad lógica de una ontología (...) social al modo en que Searle la entiende (esto es, como una empresa puramente analítica) sobre los desarrollos más específicos de la filosofía moral, social y política. Al contrario, sugerimos que, por lo que se refiere a la realidad social, los compromisos ontológicos dependen de los presupuestos sustantivos que se adopten en relación con la naturaleza y los fines de la sociedad misma, o bien no pasarán de ser un formalismo vacío sin relevancia heurística alguna. [This paper challenges the point recently made by John Searle that there are no positive human rights. We contend that the existence of positive human rights is not inconsistent, as Searle argues, with the notions of "right" and "human rights" as defined in his social ontology. Therefore, one could adhere to Searle's social ontology and assert the existence of positive human rights at the same time. Subsequently, the paper gives reason to question the alleged logical priority of social ontology in Searle's sense (i.e., as a purely analytic endeavour) over the particular developments of moral, social, and political philosophy. We suggest, on the contrary, that concerning social reality ontological commitments are dependent on substantive assumptions about the nature and aims of society itself, or else they amount to an empty formalism with no heuristic relevance.]. (shrink)

Una de las observaciones más agudas de la Lógica se encuentra escondida en una breve nota a pie de página, cuando Dewey señala el efecto pernicioso de “la literatura y los hábitos literarios” para una correcta comprensión de la relación entre las ideas o el lenguaje y la actividad práctica (LW.12: 55, nota 2). Pocas líneas antes, ha recordado el hecho obvio – pero olvidado con frecuencia por tantos filósofos del lenguaje – de que la comunicación lingüística fue durante milenios (...) únicamente ora... (shrink)

Manuel Azaña nació en un Reino, presidió una República y murió cuando España ya estaba bajo el yugo de una dictadura. Vivió una vida llena de vicisitudes en los campos de la política, pero también de la literatura y el pensamiento, que él mismo se encargó de dejar para la posteridad.

v. 1. Hermenéutica, filosofía, geneología.

Selección de textos. El primer volumen esta dedicado a la filosofía en general y contiene escritos de varios filósofos europeos y, entre los latinoamericanos, Francisco Romero. El segundo contiene textos sobre la interpretación de América Latina. Sus autores: César Fernández Moreno, Augusto Tamayo Vargas, José Lezama Lima, Roberto Fernández Retamar, Lourdes Arizpe y Benjamín Carrión. En función de las tres preguntas del título, se supone que habría un tercer volumen, dedicado a la filosofía latinoamericana"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58.

Gómez Pereira's Antoniana Margarita (1554) represents one of the most original works of his time. Its author develops some issues of great impact in later philosophy, such as animal automatism, soul-body radical separation and self-awareness.

Fifteen papers of a 1992 symposium on historical themes of both a hemispheric and a universal level, including new world perceptions, African philosophy and Columbus in textbooks.

Conversational artificial intelligence (CAI) presents many opportunities in the psychotherapeutic landscape—such as therapeutic support for people with mental health problems and without access to care. The adoption of CAI poses many risks that need in-depth ethical scrutiny. The objective of this paper is to complement current research on the ethics of AI for mental health by proposing a holistic, ethical, and epistemic analysis of CAI adoption. First, we focus on the question of whether CAI is rather a tool or an (...) agent. This question serves as a framework for the subsequent ethical analysis of CAI focusing on topics of (self-) knowledge, (self-)understanding, and relationships. Second, we propose further conceptual and ethical analysis regarding human-AI interaction and argue that CAI cannot be considered as an equal partner in a conversation as is the case with a human therapist. Instead, CAI’s role in a conversation should be restricted to specific functions. (shrink)

This paper argues that it is possible to combine enactivism and ecological psychology in a single post-cognitivist research framework if we highlight the common pragmatist assumptions of both approaches. These pragmatist assumptions or starting points are shared by ecological psychology and the enactive approach independently of being historically related to pragmatism, and they are based on the idea of organic coordination, which states that the evolution and development of the cognitive abilities of an organism are explained by appealing to the (...) history of interactions of that organism with its environment. It is argued that the idea of behavioral or organic coordination within the enactive approach gives rise to the sensorimotor abilities of the organism, while the ecological approach emphasizes the coordination at a higher-level between organism and environment through the agent’s exploratory behavior for perceiving affordances. As such, these two different processes of organic coordination can be integrated in a post-cognitivist research framework, which will be based on two levels of analysis: the subpersonal one and the personal one. If this proposal is on the right track, this may be a promising first step for offering a systematized and consistent post-cognitivist approach to cognition that retain the full potential of both enactivism and ecological psychology. (shrink)

Este Dicionario Enciclopedia do Pensamento Galego, coordinado por Andrés Torres Queiruga e Manuel Rivas García e redactado por corenta e seis persoas, trata de conxuntar un dicionario de pensadores galegos e unha visión temática que permita encadrar o labor máis directamente filosófico no campo xeral da nosa cultura. De aí a súa división en dúas partes: a primeira, un dicionario de autores, e a segunda, unha enciclopedia que complementa temas, ideas e persoeiros que propiamente non caben na primeira. Deste (...) xeito, o Dicionario, en orde alfabética, permite un percorrido polo enteiro transcurso da nosa historia intelectual e da achega realizada por cento dez autores, mentres que a Enciclopedia propicia un amplo encadramento nos diversos campos da cultura: antropoloxía, pensamento científico, dereito, economía, estética, exilio, feminismo, literatura, matemática, medicina, nacionalismo, pedagoxía, política, prensa e relixión. Por último os índices onomástico e temático permiten diversos percorridos, que, conxuntando sincronía e diacronía, poden axudar a unha visión máis integral e realista da nosa cultura. A nómina de pensadores da primeira parte chega aos nosos días, ocupándose con maior profundidade dos autores fenecidos e delimitando a extension das entradas consonte á importancia do seu pensamento. Para os autores vivos acudiuse, cando foi posible, á información dos propios interesados, adoptándose un criterio de estrita austeridade informativa, cinxíndoa a datos biográficos básicos e referencia á obra publicada no eido filosófico. Para a redacción da parte enciclopédica escolléronse estudosos cualificados, cuxa asinatura consta ao final dos mesmos. Ordenados, tamén, alfabeticamente estes traballos de maior extensión intentan ofrecer unha visión mais global e panorámica, recollendo problemas, preocupacións ou iniciativas que están presentes na cultura actual, procurando sinalar as directrices históricas que seguirn ao longo do tempo. (shrink)

ver since the traditional criteria for medical decision-making capacity (understanding, appreciation, reasoning, evidencing a choice) were formulated, they have been criticized for not taking sufficient account of emotions or values that seem, according to the critics and in line with clinical experiences, essential to decision-making capacity. The aim of this paper is to provide a nuanced and structured overview of the arguments provided in the literature emphasizing the importance of these factors and arguing for their inclusion in competence evaluations. Moreover, (...) a broader reflection on the findings of the literature is provided. Specific difficulties of formulating and measuring emotional and valuational factors are discussed inviting reflection on the possibility of handling relevant factors in a more flexible, case-specific, and context-specific way rather than adhering to a rigid set of operationalized criteria. (shrink)

Rawls theorizes principles of justice as defining a ‘pact of reconciliation’ between diverse conceptions of the good. What does fulfillment of this pact entail when reasonable pluralism is recognized as having an environmental dimension? Fair acknowledgment of the plurality of citizens’ relationships with the natural world challenges the neutrality of aims conventionally used to justify ecocide, including the promotion of economic growth and development. This paper explores how ecocide constitutes a violation of equal basic liberties and state neutrality as per (...) Rawlsian political liberalism. It further considers hard cases in which ecocide is enacted for meeting citizens’ basic needs. (shrink)

La primera parte de este artículo expone la interpretación praxeológica del concepto noológico de “acto”. En la segunda, se muestra la crítica que Antonio González Fernández hace de esta. Su objeción consiste en que los actos no pueden ser considerados cosas reales, sino solo el surgir de estas. A partir de dicha observación a la noología, González Fernández no solo da surgimiento a su praxeología (también conocida como hiparqueología), sino que su sistema filosófico comienza a ser cuestionado por no explicar (...) qué son, en el mundo de los hechos, los actos, más allá de la suposición de que ellos están ahí a pesar de ser invisibles. En la tercera y última sección se presentan algunas hipótesis para procurar solucionar ciertas objeciones al concepto praxeológico de “acto”, tales como el anteriormente mencionado y las aparentes circularidades y posibles contradicciones que hay al interior del sistema praxeológico. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se reflexiona sobre dos propuestas de Arturo Andrés Roig: la conciencia de la alteridad y el a priori antropológico para reconocer sus posibilidades de cara al progreso de la ideas y programas filosóficos. Para ello, se muestran las insuficiencias y posibilidades. Las primeras emergen al adoptar uno de los principios más importantes que sostienen el programa filosófico de la modernidad: el mantenimiento del ser humano como fundamento del mundo. Las posibilidades de sus aportes cobran fuerza a (...) la luz de las nuevas propuestas filosóficas que pretenden superar los postulados de la modernidad. (shrink)

Behavioral studies on language processing rely on the eye-mind assumption, which states that the time spent looking at text is an index of the time spent processing it. In most cases, relatively shorter reading times are interpreted as evidence of greater processing efficiency. However, previous evidence from L2 research indicates that non-native participants who present fast reading times are not always more efficient readers, but rather shallow parsers. Because earlier studies did not identify a reliable predictor of variability in L2 (...) processing, such uncertainty around the interpretation of reading times introduces a potential confound that undermines the credibility and the conclusions of online measures of processing. The present study proposes that a recently developed modulator of online processing efficiency, namely, chunking ability, may account for the observed variability in L2 online reading performance. L1 English – L2 Spanish learners’ eye movements were analyzed during natural reading. Chunking ability was predictive of overall reading speed. Target relative clauses contained L2 Verb-Noun multiword units, which were manipulated with regards to their L1-L2 congruency. The results indicated that processing of the L1-L2 incongruent units was modulated by an interaction of L2 chunking ability and level of knowledge of multiword units. Critically, the data revealed an inverse U-shaped pattern, with faster reading times in both learners with the highest and the lowest chunking ability scores, suggesting fast integration in the former, and lack of integration in the latter. Additionally, the presence of significant differences between conditions was correlated with individual chunking ability. The findings point at chunking ability as a significant modulator of general L2 processing efficiency, and of cross-language differences in particular, and add clarity to the interpretation of variability in the online reading performance of non-native speakers. (shrink)

This paper considers the environmental justice issues presented by the proposed open-pit lithium mine in Thacker Pass, Nevada (Peehee mm’huh). Unlike the environmental destruction wrought from fossil fuel extraction, lithium is used to create lithium-ion batteries for storing and using electricity from “green energy” sources. Can the potential reduction in carbon emissions resulting from the lithium mined morally and politically justify the destruction of the Pass’s sagebrush sea – a critical wildlife habitat and sacred land to the People of Red (...) Mountain? Justice issues of this kind (e.g., clashes between the “renewable energy” industry and indigenous rights) are likely to become more prevalent as the industrial economy transitions from fossil fuels to vastly more spatially extensive forms of energy production (e.g., wind and solar farms, hydroelectric dams, and biofuels). I consider the case through the concept of ecocide and explore how liberal political respect for eco-relational pluralism offers grounds on which ecocide ought to be prohibited in a fair and just society. The goal of this paper is to ensure that states, in the pursuit of environmental justice, proceed in a manner aligned with their commitment to liberalism, by refraining from prioritizing economic growth and development at the expense of other reasonable conceptions of the good. (shrink)

This paper analyzes how Transitional Justice mechanisms might be deployed to redress injustices resulting from the perpetration of ecocide. It develops the notion of ecocide as social deathas a class of environmental harms severe enough to trigger a Transitional Justice response. If a state authorizes ecological destruction in a way that demonstrates wanton disregard for the cultures intimately connected to those ecosystems, then it has violated core liberal principles of respect for pluralism. Transitional Justice can be effectively utilized in overcoming (...) these harms to transform societies from ones that tolerate grave forms of environmental destruction to eco-friendly states that further environmentalist aims. This paper explores how the four kinds of transitional justice mechanisms can aid in abating and mitigating environmental problems: (1) punitive justice mechanisms (criminal trials, lustration, and sanctions); (2) reparative justice mechanisms(reparations, rehabilitation, memorialization, apologies, and guarantees of non-repetition); (3) truth-oriented mechanisms(truth commissions, reports, and education programs); and (4) institutional reform mechanisms(changing laws and amending constitutions). (shrink)

Environmentalists have long claimed it is unjust for the state to prioritize economic interests over environmental ones by sacrificing ecosystem integrity and functioning to unsustainably expand the economy. Recently, mainstream environmentalists have moved to a more conciliatory approach highlighting the common ground between environmental and economic goals. They today claim processes of economic growth and development can be made just if they become green. This paper explores the question: should states pursue “green growth”? Although some critics claim green growth is (...) impossible, I maintain it is. I theorize three conditions that must be met for an instance of growth to be truly considered green. That a development project is green, however, does not automatically ensure it is just. Justice considerations remain in adjudicating the competing interests of different groups of stakeholders. I then examine four reasonable approaches to resolving controversies over the pursuit of green growth: cost-benefit analysis, sufficientarianism, democracy, and pluralism. I conclude a liberal pluralist form of decision-making is best for ensuring fairness. (shrink)

Different authors of Fregean inspiration have argued recently for the need of resorting to senses in order to explain successful communication. Such arguments have led some philosophers to develop theories of sense which include some of the externalist insights brought up by neo-Russellians. In this paper, we argue that these theories of sense don't work. We also present a broadly neo-Russellian account that explains away Fregean puzzles on communication without resource to entities like senses.

This essay takes up the question of a “new” social paradigm by first examining the recent emergence of the U.S. Occupied Movement (OM) as a provocative and inspiring moment of political re-composition, but one that also narrates a more complex unraveling of what W.E.B Du Bois called “democratic despotism.” The most recent political tensions and economic “crisis” of the global north point to the disruption of a white “middle class” hegemony alongside inspiring moments of reconstructed conviviality. I suggest that the (...) tension within spaces of occupation and convergence are animated by conviviality that should be read “politically” by noting the emergence of tools in service of community regeneration. Towards that end, I introduce Universidad de la Tierra Califas, a local project somewhere in-between network and collective pedagogies that is also a project of strategic conviviality and a Zapatismo beyond Chiapas. I argue that UT Califas engages a collective subject as part of an epistemological struggle inspired by Indigenous autonomy currently underway throughout Latin America. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza la concepción perspectivista del conocimiento, tal como es expuesta por Leibniz en los Nuevos Ensayos, como uno de los aspectos que marca la originalidad de este pensador en la Ilustración racionalista. Se defenderá que esta concepción se sustenta en dos tesis. En primer lugar, Leibniz sostiene que todo conocimiento humano es esencialmente perspectivista, pero esto no impide sostener, contra el escepticismo, que en cada caso las diferentes perspectivas ofrecen un conocimiento diverso de un mismo mundo. (...) En segundo lugar, para que esta perspectiva pueda ser considerada como racional y posibilite la sabiduría es preciso que tal perspectiva se reconozca a sí misma de modo auto-reflexivo como tal, es decir como un conocimiento parcial y confuso de una realidad con sentido. (shrink)

The traditional point of view on analyticity implies that truth in virtue only of meaning entails a priori acceptability and vice versa. The argument for this claim is based on the idea that meaning as it concerns truth and meaning as it concerns competence are one and the same thing. In this paper I argue that the extensions of these notions do not coincide. I hold that truth in virtue of meaning— truth for semantic reasons—doesn't imply a priori acceptability, and (...) that a priori reflection based only on knowledge of meaning—in the sense of competence—doesn't necessitate true conclusions.The main consequence of this view concerns conceptual analysis, as it presupposes we have a privileged—incorrigible in the face of empirical evidence—access to non-trivial truths about the world on the basis of mere a priori reflection founded on meaning. If, as I argue, such access is not incorrigible the project of conceptual analysis loses its special epistemological status. (shrink)

The traditional point of view on analyticity implies that truth in virtue only of meaning entails a priori acceptability and vice versa. The argument for this claim is based on the idea that meaning as it concerns truth and meaning as it concerns competence are one and the same thing. In this paper I argue that the extensions of these notions do not coincide. I hold that truth in virtue of meaning— truth for semantic reasons—doesn't imply a priori acceptability, and (...) that a priori reflection based only on knowledge of meaning—in the sense of competence—doesn't necessitate true conclusions.The main consequence of this view concerns conceptual analysis, as it presupposes we have a privileged—incorrigible in the face of empirical evidence—access to non‐trivial truths about the world on the basis of mere a priori reflection founded on meaning. If, as I argue, such access is not incorrigible the project of conceptual analysis loses its special epistemological status. (shrink)

This dissertation focuses on the topic of analyticity. The traditional concept of analyticity characterizes analytic sentences in at least two ways. On the one hand, these sentences are thought to be true in virtue only of the meaning of the expressions that constitute them. On the other hand, they are thought to be such that they can be concluded by competent speakers in an a priori fashion--that is, merely on the basis of the speakers' knowledge of the meaning of the (...) expressions contained in the sentences. In the dissertation I argue that these two ways of characterizing analyticity do not single out the same set of sentences, and that at least two different notions of meaning should be postulated to account for this fact. ;To show this I focus first on the notion of truth in virtue of meaning. I identify two ways in which a sentence can be said to be true in virtue of meaning: on the one hand, if the condition it expresses necessarily obtains; on the other hand, if semantic facts concerning the reference of the expressions that constitute it determine that it has to be true. I argue that the sets of sentences that can be said to be true in virtue of meaning according to these two criteria and the set of sentences ordinarily deemed analytically true do not coincide. ;I focus then on the second traditional criterion for analyticity--i.e., apriority. This criterion determines a set of sentences--what I call a priori acceptable sentences--that seems to coincide most closely with the set of sentences we ordinarily judge to be analytic. To account for the disparity between the extensions of this and the 'truth in virtue of meaning' criteria I propose that a distinction should be made between truth-conditional meaning--which concerns the contribution of expressions to truth-conditions--and conceptual meaning--which concerns the abilities necessary for competence in a language. I finally argue that conceptual meaning cannot always guarantee the truth of a priori acceptable sentences. (shrink)

After the great enthusiasm about the moral potentialities of empathy of the last thirty years, this phenomenon has been recently called into question, if not openly criticized, by both philosophers and psychologists among whom we find Jesse Prinz or Paul Bloom. This paper aims to show why empathy should not too easily be regarded as useless or even deleterious for morality and to propose a special role for it. In order to reach this goal, I will briefly sketch what I (...) mean with the term empathy and how is this psychological mechanism different from other akin phenomena like compassion. I will then turn my attention to some criticisms that can be made about the role of empathy for morality which show that empathy seems not a necessary element of the three main dimensions of morality, that is moral judgment, moral development and moral conduct. After that, I will try to defend empathy thanks to the identification of some important roles it can play both at a moral and at an epistemological level, in the attempt to demonstrate that empathy is in fact part of the fundamental features of a moral person. (shrink)

This book has two main objectives. The first is to identify and adequately describe the phenomenon of empathy. This essentially means offering a strong, reasoned and accurate description of the phenomenon of empathy in order to capture the essence of the empathic phenomenon and clearly distinguish it from other similar emotional phenomena such as sympathy or compassion The second part focuses on the role that this phenomenon can play on the ethical-moral level. The question is whether empathy is necessary or (...) at least important for morality, and if so, to what extent, in what way and for what reasons. This is an open access book. (shrink)

Resumen: Se discute las consecuencias de ajustar el diseño de investigaciones sociales al formato de las ciencias naturales. Se propone que el costo es la esterilidad de los intentos. Siendo la sociedad un sistema en desarrollo, la observación de hechos según las reglas del laboratorio o del experimento conducen a la invisibilidad del objeto y a un extravío del observador; lo que se escurre es el sentido de la investigación y en su reemplazo queda solo un hábito de precisión técnica. (...) En vez, se sugiere volver a la ciencia social según su impronta historicista y totalista: el contexto es todo y origen de las preguntas. El método son los caminos para producir las respuestas. La ciencia comienza antes y sigue después de este, en la relación sociología/sociedad. Ahí es cuando la investigación toma su sentido, que lleva a esa sociedad a esa pregunta: a investigarse. (shrink)

Resumen: Se discute las consecuencias de ajustar el diseño de investigaciones sociales al formato de las ciencias naturales. Se propone que el costo es la esterilidad de los intentos. Siendo la sociedad un sistema en desarrollo, la observación de hechos según las reglas del laboratorio o del experimento conducen a la invisibilidad del objeto y a un extravío del observador; lo que se escurre es el sentido de la investigación y en su reemplazo queda solo un hábito de precisión técnica. (...) En vez, se sugiere volver a la ciencia social según su impronta historicista y totalista: el contexto es todo y origen de las preguntas. El método son los caminos para producir las respuestas. La ciencia comienza antes y sigue después de este, en la relación sociología/sociedad. Ahí es cuando la investigación toma su sentido, que lleva a esa sociedad a esa pregunta: a investigarse.: This essay discusses the consequences of fitting social research designs to the format of natural sciences. It argues that the cost is null for trying. Being society a system in development, the observation of facts according to lab rules or experiments lead to the invisibility of the subject matter and loosing track to the observer; what is lost is the sense of research and its replacement is just technical precision habits. Instead it suggests going back the social science based on historical and totality roots: the context is everything and the origin of questions. The method is the road to produce answers. Science began before and continues after it, in the relationship between sociology and society. There is when research acquires its meaning, that leads that society to that question: to question itself. (shrink)